Practical Attacks on Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution Systems with
  Detector Efficiency Mismatch by Yangyang, Fei et al.
Practical Attacks on Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution Systems with Detector
Efficiency Mismatch
Fei Yangyang, Gao Ming∗, Wang Weilong, Li Chaobo, Ma Zhi
State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing, Zhengzhou, Henan, 450001, China
Abstract
To the active-basis-choice decoy state quantum key distribution systems with detector efficiency mismatch, we present a
modified attack strategy, which is based on faked states attack, with quantum non-demolition measurement ability to restress
the threat of detector efficiency mismatch. Considering that perfect quantum non-demolition measurement ability dosen’t
exist in real life, we also propose a practical attack strategy using photon number resolving detectors. Theoretical analysis
and numerical simulation results show that, without changing the channel, our attack strategies are serious threats to decoy
state quantum key distribution systems. The eavesdropper may get some information about the secret key without causing
any alarms. Besides, the lower-bound of detector efficiency mismatch to run our modified faked states attack successfully
with perfect quantum non-demolition measurement ability is also given out, which provides the producers of quantum key
distribution systems with a reference and can be treated as the approximate secure bound of detector efficiency mismatch in
decoy state quantum key distribution systems.
Keywords: quantum key distribution, decoy state method, faked states attack, detector efficiency mismatch, photon
number resolving detector
PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) ensures the security of secret key exchange between two separated parties, known
as Alice and Bob. It is based on the fundamental laws of physics and has been proved to be unconditionally secure [1, 2].
However, the devices of practical QKD systems are not perfect. The eavesdropper, known as Eve, can always take advantage
of these loopholes to get information about the secret key. One loophole happens in the weak coherent state source. There
may be more than one photon in a pulse, which leads the system vulnerable to an attack named photon number splitting
(PNS) [3]. Although it is nearly impossible to perform perfect PNS attack with prior technology, it is still a big potential
threat to the practical QKD systems. In 2011, a simplified PNS attack was implemented successfully [4]. To resist PNS
attack, the idea of decoy state method was proposed [5–8], which is widely used in practical QKD systems.
Another loophole named detector efficiency mismatch (DEM) widely exists in practical QKD systems. There are always
at least two separate gated single photon avalanche detectors for “0” and “1” values on Bob’s side. In the ideal model, the
two detectors’ efficiency curves are assumed to be perfectly matched. However, it is not like that in real life. There is a
probability of approximately 4% that large DEM occurs in practical QKD systems [9]. Besides, Eve can also induce a large
temporal DEM by interfering the calibration of the detectors [10].
Faked states attack (FSA) [11] is an intercept-resend attack, which works due to the existence of large DEM. Eve randomly
chooses her measurement basis, then prepares the opposite bit value in the opposite basis according to her measurement
results and resends the faked states to Bob at different time, denoted as t0 and t1. Bob’s detectors barely click when his
measurement basis choice is different from Eve’s. In reality, to maintain Bob’s overall detection probability the same as that
before mounting this attack, Eve uses a weak coherent state source and increases the brightness of her faked states [10, 12].
Time-shift attack also exploits DEM [9, 13]. In this attack, Eve shifts the arrival time of each of Alice’s pulse forward
or backward as she wishes. By this method, Eve can determine the detection results with large probability and introduce no
additional error. However, comparing with FSA, one drawback of time-shift attack is that it can only compensate the decrease
of Bob’s detection probability by changing the transmission of the channel, which means that Eve may be discovered when
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the transmission distance is too short. Besides, changing the transmission of the channel is not as convenient as changing
the brightness of the faked states in FSA.
Insufficient models of single photon detectors are also serious threats to the security of practical QKD systems, which can
be attacked by blinding the detectors with bright illumination [14–18]. When the detectors are blinded, they only respond to
the bright pulses. In a modified intercept-resend attack with strong resent pulses, the eavesdropper can control the responses
of the detectors to get a full copy of the secret key. This kind of attacks would be a serious concern for practical QKD
systems. Fortunately, protections against bright illumination attacks on gated avalanche photodiodes by correctly operating
them were proposed in 2011 [19].
In Ref. [12], it gave out an idea to mount FSA on weak coherent state source with quantum non-demolition (QND)
measurement ability. However, perfect QND measurement ability doesn’t exist in reality. To make FSA on decoy state QKD
more practical, we can use photon number resolving detectors (PNRDs) instead.
PNRDs are widely used in linear optical quantum computing [20] and quantum information processing [5, 21]. There are
several types of mechanisms used to construct PNRDs [22–26]. Each mechanism has its own advantages and disadvantages
[27]. Without 100% single-photon detection efficiency, PNRDs can not tell the exact photon number of each incident pulse
and the measured photon number is just a lower estimate. The single-photon detection efficiency should be as large as
possible in order to maximize the probability of detecting all the photons in the incident pulse.
FSA on single photon QKD was studied in Ref. [12], but quantitative analysis on decoy state QKD has not been done
yet. Security of QKD systems with DEM was analyzed in [28–30]. The results showed that DEM must be bounded to ensure
the security of QKD systems. In Ref. [29], the secure key generation rate formula that took DEM into account was provided
and the secure bound of DEM in single photon QKD was also given out. However, the secure bound of DEM in decoy state
QKD has not been presented because of its complexity. What’s more, the secure key generation rate formula presented in
Ref. [29] is not practical in reality because it will decrease the key generation rate.
In this paper, we attack decoy state QKD systems with DEM to restress the threat of DEM. First, we present a modified
strategy, which is based on FSA, with the ability to do QND measurement. We also provide the lower-bound of DEM to
run FSA successfully on decoy state QKD systems, which can be treated as the approximate secure bound of DEM in decoy
state QKD. Since perfect QND measurement ability doesn’t exist in real life, we find that it’s also possible to perform our
attack strategy with PNRDs. The attack strategy is exemplified using weak + vacuum decoy state BB84 [31] QKD here.
Measurement-device-independent QKD protocol was proposed to defense all side-channel attacks on the loopholes of
practical detectors in 2012 [32]. However, this protocol is difficult to realize in real world and its key generation rate (about
10bps at 100km [33]) is much lower than the traditional decoy state BB84 protocol (about 10kbps at 100km [34]), which
limits its application in practical QKD systems. So our work to attack on decoy state QKD systems is still meaningful.
This paper is organized as followed. In Sec. 2 we grant Eve a future technology named QND measurement ability to
mount FSA on decoy state QKD. The attack strategy is described and numerical simulation is done. We also present the
lower-bound of DEM to successfully attack with perfect QND measurement ability, which gives the producers of practical
QKD systems a reference. In Sec. 3 we consider a more practical situation that Eve mounts FSA with PNRDs on decoy
state QKD. The security of decoy state QKD under this attack is analyzed in Sec. 4. Finally, discussion and conclusion are
made in Sec. 5.
2. Attack with Perfect QND Measurement Ability on Decoy State QKD Systems
In this section, we will give out an attack strategy based on FSA on decoy state QKD with the assumption that Eve
has the ability to do perfect QND measurement. The attack strategy is described, then results of numerical simulation are
given out.
2.1. Attack strategy
If Eve wants to perform attack on decoy state QKD systems successfully, one possible way is to keep the key generation
rate R and the overall detection probability Qµ close to the data before mounting the attack, so QBER is naturally lower
than the threshold at the same time. In this way, Eve can get information about the secret key while she is hidden.
Fig. 1 shows the simple diagram of the attack strategy. With perfect QND measurement ability, Eve can get the photon
number information of every incident signal. According to the measured photon number, Eve controls the optical switch to
mount FSA on those signals that contain only one photon.
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Figure 1: Simple diagram of our attack strategy that Eve has QND measurement ability. PN, photon number; OS, optical switch; SP, single-photon
signal; MP, multi-photon signal; X/Z, active basis choice.
Usually, those signals that contain more than one photon can be passed undisturbedly to Bob or eavesdropped on using
PNS attack or just blocked. In Ref [12], it proposed the idea to mount FSA on weak coherent state source by letting all
multi-photon signals be passed undisturbedly. But we find that it’s the best way for Eve to block all the multi-photon signals.
The benefits of this strategy are that, first of all, the secure key of QKD with weak coherent state source all comes from
signals that contain no more than one photon. Blocking all the multi-photon signals will increase the lower-bound of the
gain of single-photon signals, Q1
L. We can get this conclusion by expanding Eq. 35 in ref. [8]. The expansion is as follow:
Q1
L =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2
∞∑
i=1
Yi
ν2(νi−2 − µi−2)
i!
where µ is the average photon number of signal state, ν is the average photon number of decoy state, and ν<µ. Yi is the yield
of an i-photon pulse. It is easy to get Q1
L diminishing with i, because Yi
ν2(νi−2−µi−2)
i! is non-positive when i≥2. Blocking
all the multi-photon signals makes i=1 or 0, thus increases Q1
L. A higher Q1
L leads to a higher secure key generation rate
which is good for Eve. Second, the idea of letting those multi-photon signals be passed undisturbedly will make a small part
of the key unavailable, but our strategy will not, which is the same as the idea of eavesdropping the multi-photon signals
using PNS attack.
In order to maintain the overall detection probability of Bob’s detectors, Eve uses weak coherent state source to generate
faked states. The average photon number of the faked states sent by Eve at t0 (t1) is µ0(µ1). According to Ref. [10], the
detection probability of faked states on Bob’s detector “0”, p0(µ0, µ1), and “1”, p1(µ0, µ1), are:
p0(µ0, µ1) = 0.75 + 0.25d− 0.25(1− d)(e−0.5µ0η00 + e−0.5µ1η01 + e−µ1η01), (1)
p1(µ0, µ1) = 0.75 + 0.25d− 0.25(1− d)(e−0.5µ0η10 + e−0.5µ1η11 + e−µ1η10), (2)
where ηmn, m,n∈{0, 1}, represents the equivalent overall transmission and detection efficiency between Alice and Bob’s de-
tector m at time tn. d is the dark count probability of Bob’s detectors.
The total detection probability of faked states on Bob’s detectors parrive(µ0, µ1) is
parrive(µ0, µ1) = 1− 0.25(1− d)(e−µ1η01 + e−µ0η10) + 0.25d(1− d)
×(e−µ1η01 + e−µ0η10)− 0.25(1− d)2(e−0.5µ0η00−0.5µ0η10 + e−0.5µ1η01−0.5µ1η11).
And the error rate of faked states perror(µ0, µ1) is
perror(µ0, µ1) = 0.125(1− d)(e−0.5µ0η00 + e−0.5µ1η11 − e−0.5µ0η10 − e−0.5µ1η01 − e−µ1η01 − e−µ0η10)
−0.125(1− d)2(e−0.5µ0η00−0.5µ0η10 + e−0.5µ1η01−0.5µ1η11) + 0.125d(1− d)(e−µ1η01 + e−µ0η10)+0.5.
In our attack strategy with QND measurement ability, the overall detection probability of signal state on Bob’s detectors
includes the detection probability of faked states resent by Eve and the dark count probability, that is
Qµ = parrive(µ0, µ1)µe
−µ + (1− µe−µ)d.
Similarly the detection rate of the decoy state with an average photon number of ν is
Qυ = parrive(µ0, µ1)υe
−υ + (1− υe−υ)d.
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The error rate contains the error probability of faked states and the error probability from dark count, so we have
EµQµ = perror(µ0, µ1)µe
−µ +
1
2
(1− µe−µ)d.
And the overall QBER after attack is given by
Eµ =
EµQµ
Qµ
.
Eve is able to control three parameters. They are µ0, µ1 and the maximum value of DEM denoted as k, where k=η00/η10=η11/η01
and η00=η11. In order to keep the detection probability of Bob’s “0” and “1” detectors equivalent, according to Eqs. (1),
(2), we can assume that µ0=µ1=µ
′. Alice and Bob use the following formulas
Y1
L =
µ
µν − ν2 (Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
d),
Q1
L = µe−µY1L,
e1
U =
EvQve
v − 12d
Y1
Lν
,
to estimate the lower-bound of the gain of single-photon signals Q1
L and the upper-bound of the error rate of single-photon
signals e1
U . According to the idea of GLLP, they can get the lower-bound of the key generation rate R, which is given by
R ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +QL1 [1−H2(eU1 )]},
where q = 12 , f(x) is the bidirectional error correction efficiency, H2(x) = −xlog2x− (1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon
information function.
2.2. Numerical simulation
The numerical simulations in this paper use some GYS [35] experiment parameters, including the loss coefficient in the
quantum channel α = 0.21dB/km; the dark count probability d=1.7× 10−6; the transmittance in Bob’s side ηBob =0.045;
the average photon number of the signal state µ = 0.48; the average number of the decoy state ν = 0.05; the bidirectional
error correction efficiency is 1.22. We also assume that k≤1000, η01=tABηBob×10−4(these two assumptions are reasonable
and they can be achieved in reality [10]), where tAB is the channel transmittance. edetector=0 is also assumed to simplify our
calculation processing, which means no photon hits the erroneous detector.
Figure 2: The relationship of R, k and µ′ when Eve has perfect QND measurement ability.
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For a fixed transmission distance of 100km, when Eve has perfect QND measurement ability, Fig. 2 shows the relationship
of R, k and µ′ when R is positive and it is ignored when R<0 . We can figure out that R rises along with k and µ′, and there
are many combinations of k and µ′ for the same R. Besides, when k is small enough, R is negative no matter how large µ′ is.
So it is easy to find a tuple [k, µ′] that makes our attack successful with perfect QND measurement ability, such as
k=310, µ′=300. Fig. 3 gives out the comparisons of R and Qµ.
(a)
(b)
Figure 3: (color online). (a)The solid line shows the key generation rate without attack. The dotted line shows the key generation rate under our
attack with perfect QND measurement ability. Here assuming that edetector=0, so the secure transmission distance extends from 140km to 160km.
(b)The solid line shows the detection probability of signal state without attack. The dotted line shows the detection probability of signal state
under our attack with perfect QND measurement ability. We have to note that legitimate users do not take DEM into account when calculating
the key generation rate and the detection probability without attack.
From Fig. 3, we can see that when Eve has perfect QND measurement ability, R and Qµ under our attack are both very
close to the normal value. So Eve stays undetected. We have to notice that the numerical simulation above uses k=310, not
the maximum value 1000. As we enlarge the value of k, the attack effects will be better.
Although the lager k is, the better attack effects Eve will get, we are still concerned about the minimum value of k,
which is set as kmin, to make R positive in ideal situation that Eve has perfect QND measurement ability. Fig. 4 shows
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the relationship between kmin and the transmission distance L. kmin rises with L, and when kmin is larger than 35, FSA
on decoy state QKD is possible in ideal situation. This provides a reference for the producers of QKD systems. If they can
improve the calibration process to guarantee the DEM below 35, FSA will no longer be a threat to decoy state QKD. In
other words, the result of 35 can also be treated as the approximate secure bound of DEM in decoy state QKD systems.
Figure 4: The relationship between kmin and L
3. Practical Attack with PNRDs on Decoy State QKD Systems
In Sec. 2, we consider the situation that Eve has perfect QND measurement ability, which doesn’t exist in the real world.
In this section, we will discuss a more realistic situation that Eve only has PNRDs. We present our attack strategy first, and
show numerical simulation results later.
3.1. Attack strategy
Figure 5: Simple diagram of our attack strategy with PNRDs. Eve and Bob use active basis choice here. X/Z, active basis choice; D0, photon
number resolving detector 0; D1, photon number resolving detector 1; FS, faked states source.
Fig. 5 shows the simple diagram of our practical attack strategy with PNRDs. Eve attacks the system with active basis
choice at a place close to Alice. She uses two PNRDs for “0”, “1” bit value, and gets the “photon number” of every incident
pulses by calculating the summation of the detection results of two detectors, which can not be achieved by using single
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photon detectors. In our attack strategy, Eve mounts FSA only when her measurement results are single-photon signals, and
the corresponding probability of signal state is
psingle =
∞∑
i=1
p(i)
(
i
1
)
η(1− η)i−1 = µηe−µη,
where η is the single-photon detection efficiency of Eve’s PNRDs, p(i) = µ
i
i! e
−µ is the probability of i-photon signal. The
dark count probability of Eve’s PNRDs is ignored because it’s much smaller than psingle. There are several benefits of this
strategy. First, this strategy may partially distinguish the multi-photon signals and block them. Second, Eve can get most
of the information about the secret key, and this strategy is easy to perform. At last, “double-click” means that Eve’s basis
choice is different from Alice’s, and it should be discarded to benefit Eve. Mounting FSA only when Eve’s measurement
results are single-photon signals eliminates the influence of “double-click”.
Similar with the attack strategy in Sec. 2, we can get the overall detection probability of signal state on Bob’s detectors:
Qµ = parrive(µ0, µ1)µηe
−µη + (1− µηe−µη)d.
The detection rate of the decoy state with an average photon number of ν is
Qυ = parrive(µ0, µ1)υηe
−υη + (1− υηe−υη)d.
The error rate is
EµQµ = perror(µ0, µ1)µηe
−µη +
1
2
(1− µηe−µη)d.
And the overall QBER after attack is given by
Eµ =
EµQµ
Qµ
.
3.2. Numerical simulation
Here we take k=1000, µ′=900 and η=0.1 [36]. Fig. 6 gives out the comparisons of R and Qµ when attacking with
PNRDs.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6: (color online). (a)The solid line shows the key generation rate without attack. The dotted line shows the key generation rate under our
attack with PNRDs that η=0.1. (b)The solid line shows the detection probability without attack. The dotted line shows the detection probability
under our attack with PNRDs that η=0.1.
As shown in Fig. 6, when L>30 km, R and Qµ under our attack are both very close to the normal value. So Eve remains
hidden. The deviation from theoretical values is large only when the transmission distance is shorter than 30km. This is
because the channel transmittance is large when the distance is short, which makes the expectation detection probability
large. What’s more, large average photon number of faked states causes large overall error rate, and makes R lower than
legitimate users’ expectation.
The measurements in the attack strategy with perfect QND ability can be separated into two parts. The first one is the
photon number measurement, and the other is the measurement when mounting FSA. However, our strategy with practical
PNRDs can put these two parts together which measures the photon number and does the measurement in FSA at the same
time. It is also the reason why our strategy is interesting. When η=1, Eve is able to mount FSA on all the single-photon
signals and block all the multi-photon signals which is exactly the same with that using perfect QND measurement ability.
8
4. The Security Analysis
Eve’s attack with QND measurement ability is always better than that with PNRDs. When Eve attacks with PNRDs
whose η is not 1, she can only distinguish part of the single-photon signals. To maintain Qµ the same as Bob’s expectation,
the average photon number of faked states should be larger than that attacking with perfect QND measurement ability.
However, larger average photon number of the faked states leads to larger error rate, which decreases the key generation rate.
Here we analyze the security of the strategy that Eve attacks with PNRDs as an example. In our attack strategy, Eve
might steal some information about the secret key without being detected. However, she can not get all of the key. When
Eve’s measurement basis is different from Alice’s and Bob’s, legitimate users may share some absolutely secure key while Eve
doesn’t know, which is represented by Rabsolute. To explain Rabsolute in detail, we give out an example that Alice prepares
bit 0 in the Z basis and Bob measures in the Z basis, while Eve measures in the X basis. When Eve’s measurement result is
bit 1, according to the FSA theory, the faked state resent by Eve is bit 0 in the Z basis and Bob will get bit 0 as a result.
Although the probability of this kind of cases is very small, Alice and Bob will share some absolutely secure key. Using the
similar idea in Ref. [10] we can get Table 1, from which Rabsolute can be calculated.
Table 1: Given that Alice prepares bit 0 and 1 in the Z basis and that Bob measures in the Z basis, Eve measures in X basis to mount FSA. The
first column contains Alice’s bit value. The second column shows Eve’s measurement result. The third column shows the parameters of the faked
state resent by Eve: basis, bit, mean photon number, timing. The fourth column shows Bob’s measurement result; 0 ∩ 1 denotes a double click.
The last column shows the corresponding detection probabilities.
Z→ →Eve Eve→ Bob’s result Detection probability
0 or 1 0 Z,1,µ0,t0 0 r0 = 0
1 r1 = 1− exp[−µ0η1(t0)]
0 ∩ 1 r0r1
Loss 1− (r0 + r1 − r0r1)
0 or 1 1 Z,0,µ1,t1 0 s0 = 1− exp[−µ1η0(t1)]
1 s1 = 0
0 ∩ 1 s0s1
Loss 1− (s0 + s1 − s0s1)
There are two situations that will induce Rabsolute. One is that Alice prepares in the Z basis, Bob measures in the Z
basis and Eve measures in the X basis. The other is Alice prepares in X basis, Bob measures in the X basis and Eve measures
in the Z basis. The probability that the two situations above occur is 14 . From Table 1, in the first situation, the absolutely
secure key rate is 12 (r1 + s0). Similarly, the absolutely secure key rate in the second situation is the same. The probability
that we mount FSA is µηe−µη. So we can get the overall absolutely secure key between Alice and Bob is
Rabsolute = µηe
−µη × 1
4
× 1
2
(r1 + s0) =
1
8
µηe−µη(r1 + s0).
According to the decoy state theory, if the key generation rate R is larger than Rabsolute, it means that Eve can always get
some information about the key. Here we take η=0.1 to do numerical simulation.
The result is shown in Fig. 7. As we can see, Rabsolute is always smaller than R, which means Eve can always get
information about the key while she is hidden. So the overall security of decoy state QKD is broken.
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Figure 7: The dashed line represents the key generation rate R and the dotted line shows the relationship between Rabsolute and L.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, to the decoy state QKD systems with active basis choice, we give out a modified attack strategy with
perfect QND measurement ability to restress the threat of DEM. We also propose a more practical attack strategy using
PNRDs as perfect QND measurement ability dosen’t exist in the real world. In our attack strategy, Eve blocks all the
multi-photon signals and only mounts FSA when her measurement results are single-photon signals. We find that Eve can
maintain the key generation rate R and the detection probability Qµ close to the data without being attacked, and keep
the QBER low at the same time. So Eve can remain undetected. The security analysis shows that the eavesdropper could
always get information about the key without being detected, so the overall security of practical decoy state QKD systems
is broken. We also present the lower-bound of DEM (about 35) to mount FSA successfully with perfect QND measurement
ability on decoy state QKD systems, which can be treated as the approximate secure bound of DEM.
In conclusion, by mounting our practical attack strategy on the active-basis-choice decoy state QKD systems with no
corresponding protections, the eavesdropper is able to get information about the secret key while she is hidden.
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